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ANTITRUST-RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE-LEGALITY OF FAIR TRADE CON-
TRACTS MADE BY INTEGRATED F1RM-Defendant-appellee manufactures its 
own brand-name line of drug products and is also the largest drug whole-
saler in the United States.1 Its manufactured products are sold through 
appellee's own wholesale division and to independent wholesalers and re-
tailers. In 1951 appellee entered into resale price maintenance contracts 
with these independent wholesalers, most of whom competed with appel-
lee's wholesale divisions. The Government then brought an action for an 
injunction under section 4 of the Sherman Act,2 restraining the further use 
of resale price contracts by appellee on the ground that these contracts con-
stituted illegal price fixing under section 1 of the act.3 The appellee 
argued that the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts4 exempted these contracts 
from the Sherman Act prohibition. The Government, however, contended 
that these contracts came within the proviso excepting certain contracts 
from the Miller-Tydings and McGuire protection.:. The lower court denied 
1 Principal case at 305. 
2 26 StaL 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4. 
3 26 StaL 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. 
4 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1 (Miller-Tydings Act); 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 
15 U.S.C. (1952) §45 (McGuire Act). 
5 This proviso removes resale price maintenance contracts ". . . between manufac-
turers . . . or between wholesalers . . . or between retailers, or between persons, firms 
or corporations in competition with each other" from the protection of the Miller-
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the Government's motion for summary judgment, stating that under the 
present case law it was unwilling to hold fair trade agreements illegal per 
-se simply because the producer is also a wholesaler, unless there is a showing 
that there is an additional restraint on competition other than that which 
naturally results from resale price maintenance contracts.6 On direct ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed, three justices dissenting.7 Since 
appellee competes at the same functional level as the contracting inde-
pendent wholesalers, the contracts are not protected by the McGuire and 
Miller-Tydings Acts, and are therefore illegal per se.8 United States v. Mc-
Kesson and Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). 
In the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts, Congress exempted vertical 
price-fixing agreements between a manufacturer of brand-name goods and 
its customers from the illegal per se prohibition of the antitrust laws. 0 
These acts, however, except from their protection contracts " ... between 
manufacturers . . . or between wholesalers . . . or between retailers, or be-
tween persons, firms or corporations in competition with each other."10 
The principal case raises the question whether fair trade contracts with 
independent wholesalers made by an integrated firm of the manufacturer-
wholesaler type fall within the above exception and thereby become illegal 
per se. In answering this question affirmatively, the majority reasons, first, 
that since appellee is both a manufacturer and a wholesaler, it acts in both 
capacities and cannot say it acted solely as a manufacturer in making these 
contracts.11 Therefore, as a wholesaler, appellee was clearly within the 
"between the wholesalers"12 language of the proviso.13 Secondly, and 
principally, since the statutory proviso is unambiguous,14 legislative history15 
Tydings Act. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. The McGuire Act contains 
essentially the same provision. 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. 
6 United States v. McKesson and Robbins, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 333, noted in 
64 YALE L. J. 426 (1955). 
7 Justice Harlan wrote the dissent, in which Justices Burton and Frankfurter concurred. 
s United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
o Prior to the enactment of this enabling legislation the Supreme Court had held that 
resale price maintenance contracts were illegal per se. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
10 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1; 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. 
11 Principal case at 312. 
12 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1; 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45. 
13 The Federal Trade Commission has held that in the integrated situation it is a 
question of fact whether the manufacturer in entering into a fair trade contract is acting 
as a manufacturer, retailer or wholesaler. Eastman Kodak Co., Dkt. No. 6040, CCH 
Trade Reg. Rep. (transfer binder 1955) 1125,291. In this case the integration was on the 
manufacturer-retailer level. For an informative and lucid legal and economic analysis 
of the problems involved in this area, see Weston, "Resale Price Maintenance and Market 
Integration: Fair Trade or Foul Play," 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1954). 
14 It is difficult to agree with the majority's conclusion that the proviso is unambiguous 
in view of the problems of interpretation it has presented to others. In 52 HARV. L. REv. 
284 (1938), the problem presented by the proviso was clearly recognized and a conclu-
sion that the act did protect the integrated firm was reached. In Doubleday & Co., 3 
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need not be resorted to, and therefore the "crucial inquiry" is whether 
there is competition on the same functional level between the parties to the 
contract. The majority concludes that since appellee's own wholesale divi-
sions compete with the independent contracting wholesalers, appellee's 
contracts with the independents are not exempted from the Sherman Act. 
This rationale seems erroneous, however, as pointed out by the dissent. 
Why should competition be made the crucial determinant, when under all 
resale price situations price competition as to the fair traded product will 
be eliminated at the purchaser's level_?16 Unless there is an additional re-
striction upon competition, as was required by the lower court,17 it would 
seem that instead of being crucial the inquiry is immaterial. Had the 
majority looked to the policy of the fair trade acts, which is to protect the 
good will in the brand name of a product,18 rather than relying on a literal 
interpretation of the proviso, a different result would seem to have been 
required. Neither the majority nor the legislative history indicates why an 
integrated firm has less claim to brand name protection than a non-inte-
grated one.19 As the dissent suggests, the evil aimed at in the proviso would 
seem to be the prevention of contracts between competitors limiting the 
price on competing brands.20 
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1Jll,515 (FTC 1953), respondent book publisher, who had his 
own retail outlets, made fair trade contracts with independent retailers. Reversing and re-
manding the hearing examiner's decision that respondent was still within the protection 
of the McGuire Act, the commission wrote three different opinions as to the proper con-
struction of the proviso. Two commissioners advocated an examination of the con-
tracts and the facts surrounding their making to determine in what capacity respondent 
was acting when he entered into the contracts. , Two other commissioners required a 
finding of competition between the respondent's retail outlets and independents to 
remove the McGuire Act protection. A third commissioner held that the protection 
would be removed if there were a restriction of price competition between the retailers. 
Later in the Eastman Kodak Co. case, note 13 supra, the commission reversed everything 
that they had previously said contrary to their opinion in that case. Lastly, in Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133 N.Y.S. (2d) 908 (1954), where the same issue was presented, 
the New York Supreme Court construed the McGuire and Miller-Tydings Acts to permit 
integrated firms to engage in resale price fixing, relying mainly on an extensive examina-
tion of the legislative history of these acts. 
15 For legislative history, see principal case at 313, footnote 17, and Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Schwartz, note 14 supra. In 98 CONG. REc. 8717 (1952), Senator Douglas said that 
he knew of nothing which would prevent a manufacturer from purchasing his own 
retail outlet, making a resale price maintenance contract with it, and then enforcing the 
contract against all other retailers. See also the extracts of congressional debates in East-
man Kodak Co., note 13 supra. 
16 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, note 14 supra, at 922; United States v. McKesson 
&: Robbins, note 6 supra. See also, W'eston, "Resale Price i\<Iaintenance and Market 
Integration: Fair Trade or Foul Play?" 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658 at 678 (1954). 
17 United States v. McKesson and Robbins, note 6 supra. 
18 Dissent in principal case at 316; 81 CONG. REc. 8141 (1937). 
19 Eastman Kodak Co., note 13 supra, at p. 35,424; Eastman Kodak v. Schwartz, note 
14 supra, at 922. 
20 In reporting to the House of Representatives on the conference report on the 
Miller-Tydings bill Representative McLaughlin stated: "As an example, the act would 
not allow two manufacturers of similar trademarked articles, as, for instance articles 
of food or drugs . . . to agree between themselves as to the price at which their respec-
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Under established methods of marketing21 the effect of this decision 
will be to foreclose considerably the possible use of resale price maintenance. 
The general rule of the principal case is that if parties to a fair trade agree-
ment compete on any level the agreement will be illegal. For example, the 
non-integrated manufacturer which sells directly to retailers can not, it 
would seem, have fair trade contracts with wholesalers.22 The principal 
case prohibits the integrated manufacturer-wholesaler from making fair 
trade contracts with independent wholesalers, and if either the manu-
facturing or wholesaling division sells directly to consumers, then fair trade 
contracts with retailers may be forbidden. 23 An integrated manufacturer-
retailer's fair trade agreements with wholesalers would seem to be permis-
sible unless the wholesalers sold directly to consumers or the manufactur-
er's retail divisions sold to other retailers.24 Thus, a manufacturer desiring 
to use fair trade contracts must make a thorough analysis of the market 
to determine whether or not it is competing with any of its own customers 
for sales. 25 
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tive articles shall be sold." 81 CONG. REc. 8141 (1937). 
21 The extent of the area foreclosed to resale price maintenance can be appreciated 
by an examination of the following figures on marketing methods used by manufacturers: 
26.5% of all manufacturers' sales are to wholesalers and jobbers. 
25.2% of all manufacturers' sales are to industrial and other large users. 
23.8% of all manufacturers' sales are to or through their own wholesale divisions. 
19.9% of all manufacturers' sales are to retailers. 
2.8% of all manufacturers' sales are to their own retail stores. 
1.8% of all manufacturers' sales are to customers at retail. 
Duncan, "Channels of Distribution for Consumers Goods," MARKETING BY MANUFACTURERS 
(Phillips ed. 1951) at 219. At page 19 of its brief to the Supreme Court, appellee offered 
the following figures: "The certified results of a survey made by American Fair Trade 
Council of known fair trading manufacturers reveals that 86% of all such manufacturers 
who responded to inquiries made of them sold 'fair traded' products to wholesalers. Of 
this 86% who sold to wholesalers, 82% also sold to retailers, 34% also sold to consumers, 
10% also have wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries that sell to wholesalers, 9% also 
have wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries that sell to retailers and 4% also have 
wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries that sell to consumers." 
22 If any of the contracting wholesalers sold directly to consumers then the manufac-
turer would also seem to be precluded from engaging in direct sales to potential con-
sumer customers of these wholesalers. A special problem is presented by the marketing 
method of "drop shipment," where the manufacturer ships goods directly to the retailer 
and the retailer is instructed to credit the sale to any of the wholesalers in the area with 
whom the manufacturer does business. This practice would probably be permissible even 
where the manufacturer has fair trade contracts with wholesalers, because in effect, there 
is no competition on the manufacturer's part as to this wholesale function. 
23 Even if neither wholesaler nor manufacturer sells directly to consumers, there is 
still the possibility that some of the contracting retailers sell to other retailers and 
thereby create competition among the contracting parties. 
24 Of course, the manufacturer-retailers' contracts with independent retailers fall 
directly under the rule of the principal case. 
25 In note 66 in Weston, "Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: Fair 
Trade or Foul Play?" 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 at 680 (1954), the author suggests that 
manufacturers who engage in what is now considered illegal price fixing under the prin-
cipal case are subject to treble damage suits by any non-signing competing dealer who 
can show actual damage. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15. 
